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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Improved estimates show 
state and local job multipliers 
are about one-quarter lower 
than commonly assumed 
by economic development 
policymakers.
  
n Multipliers are lower 
because commonly used 
models do not adjust for how 
job growth increases local land 
prices, wages, and other costs.
n We estimate job multipliers 
are similar regardless of 
community or market size.
n Local job multipliers are 
higher when the employed 
share of the population 
is lower. 
nHigh-tech industries in high-
tech areas can have multipliers 
twice as high as those of other 
industries, reflecting greater 
benefits of clustering near 
other similar firms.
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Economic development policymakers often 
claim large job multipliers. For the recent Amazon 
project in New York, the claimed job multiplier 
for New York State was 2.7—for every 100 jobs at 
Amazon, 170 other jobs would result.
At the state level, job multipliers are often 
claimed to be 2.5 to 4.0, while for local labor 
markets, such as metropolitan areas, job multipliers 
are claimed to be 2.0 or higher. High-tech 
multipliers are sometimes claimed to be as great as 
6—each high-tech job will create 5 other local jobs.
Correctly estimating the multiplier is important 
because size does matter. Consider the benefits for 
local residents from firms locating in their area 
in exchange for tax incentives. Benefits include 
increases in local employment-to-population 
ratios. However, these benefits depend on total jobs 
created, which scale roughly proportionately with 
the multiplier. If the multiplier is twice as big, the 
benefit-cost ratio will be twice as big. 
Currently claimed multipliers rest on many 
assumptions. Compared to prior models, we 
take a more data-driven approach with fewer 
assumptions, and, crucially, we allow for cost 
feedbacks. When a local economy grows, local 
costs (land prices, wages) rise. Higher local costs 
repel other firms, lowering multipliers. Excluding 
cost feedbacks could lead to overestimated 
multipliers.
Our estimates lead to several important 
findings:
1) Job multipliers are lower than commonly 
assumed. We find job multipliers about one-
quarter lower than is often expected: at the 
state level, around 2.0 rather than 2.7; at the 
local level, around 1.5 rather than 2.0. 
2) As a result, benefit-cost ratios for incentives 
are lower. These new estimates imply benefit-
cost ratios for incentives that would be about 
one-quarter lower. 
3) Even smaller areas have similar multipliers. 
Multipliers don’t increase for larger states 
or larger local labor markets. Advantages of 
larger size are offset by disadvantages; more 
population might increase congestion.  
4) Multipliers are localized. County multipliers 
are only one-quarter below local labor market 
multipliers. Local labor market multipliers are 
only one-quarter below state multipliers.
5) Multipliers increase with more available 
labor. Local multipliers may be 5–15 percent 
higher in local labor markets with a depressed 
employment-to-population ratio.  
6) High-tech multipliers are higher, but only 
in areas with preexisting high-tech clusters. 
High-tech multipliers in local labor markets 
may be as high as 2.9, but only in areas with 
significantly more high-tech clusters than the 
national average. High-tech clusters benefit 
high-tech firms by allowing workers and ideas 
to migrate from one firm to another.   
 
How Multipliers Evolve
Creating jobs at a new or expanded facility may 
immediately spur the creation of other jobs in the 
area for two reasons: 
1) Supplier linkages. The new or expanded 
facility may purchase from local suppliers, 
increasing these suppliers’ sales and their need 
for more workers.
2) Worker demand. Workers at the new 
or expanded facility, and workers at the 
facility’s suppliers, may spend money at local 
restaurants, brewpubs, grocery stores, hardware 
stores, farmers’ markets, clothing stores, yoga 
studios, etc. This local spending will in turn 
create jobs in these service industries. In 
addition, some of these goods and services 
Realistic Local Job Multipliers 
Timothy J. Bartik and Nathan Sotherland
Higher costs reduce the net 
multiplier by one-quarter.
will be produced locally (beer from 
breweries, produce from farmers, 
yoga instructors from a nearby 
college), which will also generate 
local jobs. 
However, these initial job effects can 
eventually produce broader impacts, 
both good and bad:
• Cost feedbacks. Job growth 
increases demand for local 
land and labor, which will 
consequently increase land 
prices and wages. As a result, 
other businesses will find it more 
expensive to hire workers or rent 
a building. These increased costs 
will discourage job creation. 
• Agglomeration economies or 
industry cluster spillovers. For 
some industries and areas, a 
greater concentration of similar 
jobs or workers may increase 
productivity. In high-tech 
industries, especially, ideas  
(and workers) may move 
between firms. Higher 
productivity will make the area 
more competitive for adding 
jobs.
How do these factors play out 
over time? The supplier and worker 
demand effects begin immediately but 
continue to increase as local suppliers 
and retailers gear up production. The 
negative effects of cost feedbacks take 
longer to become apparent, as firms 
only gradually adjust their job creation 
decisions in response to higher costs. 
Cluster spillovers, when they’re 
present, also take some time to occur. 
Figure 1 shows our estimates of how 
the typical local job multiplier evolves 
over time. The immediate multiplier 
is 1.4: for every 100 jobs created at a 
new or expanded facility, another 40 
local jobs would also be created very 
quickly. This multiplier expands over 
the next two years to 1.9, due to the 
creation of another 50 jobs as local 
suppliers, retailers, and other service-
providers respond to the increased 
demand for their wares. However, the 
negative effects of higher costs then 
begin to kick in. These higher costs 
destroy about 40 jobs, reducing the net 
multiplier after five years to 1.5. The 
multiplier approximately stabilizes after 
this point. 
Because most current estimates of 
the job multiplier ignore cost feedback 
effects, they conclude that the multiplier 
is 1.9 or 2.0, about one-fourth higher 
than the true long-run multiplier.
Differences in Multipliers
These multiplier estimates are for 
a local labor market, which we define 
as the commuting zone—groups of 
U.S. counties within which there is 
significant commuting. What about 
other types of areas? 
At the state level, the long-run 
multiplier is about one-quarter higher, 
at 1.9 rather than 1.5 (Table 1). States 
are big enough to include more 
suppliers. In addition, if the new jobs 
create some fiscal benefits, the state 
government may cut taxes or increase 
spending, boosting the state economy. 
At the smaller, county level, the 
long-run multiplier is about one-
quarter lower, at 1.1 rather than 1.5. 
Some of the supplier and service jobs 
created in the commuting zone will be 
outside the county in which the new 
or expanded facility is located, thus 
lowering the county multiplier. 
However, across commuting zones 
of different sizes, we find similar long-
run multipliers. This is surprising. 
Wouldn’t larger commuting zones have 
more suppliers and retailers whose 
job creation would be stimulated? Yes, 
but larger commuting zones also have 
more problems with higher costs and 
congestion. As a larger commuting 
zone gets more jobs, land may become 
scarcer, roads more crowded, etc. 
These congestion effects reduce the 
multiplier. Apparently, the advantages 
of more suppliers and retailers in larger 
commuting zones are roughly offset by 
the larger congestion costs. As a result, 
even smaller commuting zones can 
count on at least some multiplier effects.
Besides the size of the area, 
multipliers are affected also by 
local labor supply conditions. In 
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Years since initial job increase
commuting zones with a lower share 
of the population aged 25–54 in 
employment—the so-called prime-age 
employment-to-population ratio—the 
multiplier is slightly higher, at 1.6 rather 
than 1.5.
Furthermore, some industries have 
higher multipliers than others. For 
example, multipliers can be significantly 
higher for high-tech industries, at 
2.9 rather than 1.5. This only holds, 
however, in commuting zones that 
already have significantly above-average 
high-tech clusters: commuting zones 
whose high-tech employment share is 
in the top one-fifth of all commuting 
zones (Figure 2). In more average 
commuting zones, with a more average 
high-tech industry share, the high-
tech job multiplier is only 1.7, which 
is close to the average multiplier for all 
industries.
The Advantages of More  
Flexible Models
We have calculated all these 
multipliers using a strategy relying 
on national increases in demand for 
an area’s specialized industries. This 
strategy imposes few assumptions and 
allows the data to drive the estimation.
In contrast, the predominant 
approach used by most economic 
development policymakers is regional 
input-output models. These models 
rely on national relationships of the 
inputs industries purchase from each 
other, as well as how much workers 
buy from retailers and other stores. The 
models then apply assumptions about 
the proportions of these purchases 
that come from local suppliers and 
retailers. These assumptions may not 
be correct, and there is no guarantee 
that relationships that hold nationally 
also hold for a given local area. Most 
importantly, however, regional input-
output models do not allow for any 
negative impacts from higher local 
costs. Yet, our results show such 
negative cost feedback is important, 
reducing long-run job multipliers by 
roughly one-quarter. 
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 1  Long-Term Job Multipliers
What Is Needed: Realistic Multipliers
Large multipliers are not magic pixie 
dust that should be sprinkled on every 
economic development project to give it 
a large payoff. Job multipliers certainly 
exist: an economic development project 
that directly creates jobs will also 
induce some additional, local spinoff 
jobs. But the number of these spinoff 
jobs is less than is often claimed.
What should policymakers 
do? When evaluating projects, we 
recommend that the multipliers from 
regional input-output models should be 
scaled back. Does the project still make 
sense if the job multiplier is one-quarter 
to one-third less than the number 
“estimated” by a regional input-output 
model?
More generally, we need to invest 
in developing better estimates of job 
multipliers and applying them under 
diverse circumstances. We hope our 
paper will lead to further work that 
helps inform policymakers about 
what multipliers might be realistic for 
different industries in different local 
economies. 
This article draws on research from an 
Upjohn Institute working paper, which can 
be found at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/301. 
Support for this project was provided by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts. The views expressed are those 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Pew Charitable Trusts.
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist, and Nathan 
Sotherland a senior research analyst, at the Upjohn 
Institute. 
Commuting zones States Counties
Baseline assumptions 1.5 1.9 1.1
Low employment rates 1.6
High-tech jobs in high-tech cluster 2.9


















One concern that policymakers 
have regarding employer-sponsored 
health insurance is “job lock” and its 
effects on labor markets. Workers value 
health benefits, but health benefits are 
not transferable across jobs. Thus, a 
worker could want to pursue a more 
desirable job opportunity but may 
choose not to because that worker 
might lose her health insurance 
coverage. This condition could cause 
a worker to forgo career satisfaction 
or promotion or advancement. 
Policymakers worry about this 
phenomenon because it may limit 
worker effectiveness and lower the 
incentive toward entrepreneurship.
 One goal of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), passed in 2010, is to 
increase the portability of health 
insurance across jobs. In our study, we 
examine the effect of the dependent 
mandate (in which young adults under 
26 years old are permitted to remain 
on their parents’ health insurance) 
on reenlistment rates for soldiers in 
the U.S. Army, a relatively healthy 
group for whom we can observe many 
characteristics typically not available 
for private-sector workers. We use 
variation from the policy change to 
compare soldiers aged 23–25 to those 
aged 27–30. We compare these groups 
before and after the passage of the 
ACA. While the younger group gains 
access to their parents’ health insurance 
after ACA enactment—even if they 
leave the army—the older group does 
not. This difference-in-differences 
approach allows us to estimate the 
causal effect of having health insurance 
from an external source—one’s 
parents—on reenlistment of active-
duty military members in the army. 
We find that reenlistment rates were 
similar for soldiers aged 23–25 and 27–
30 before the ACA, but once soldiers 
under 26 became eligible for their 
parents’ health insurance, the younger 
soldiers began to leave the army at a 
rate 5 percent higher than before the 
policy change, while rates for the older 
soldiers did not change appreciably. 
Moreover, the increase in leaving was 
concentrated among soldiers with 
higher test scores. It appears that 
flexibility achieved through the ACA 
may be bad for the firm (in this case 
the U.S. Army) because it is losing 
some of its most talented employees 
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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n  We test whether access to parents’ health insurance led soldiers to not reenlist in 
the army.
n  The ACA allowed people under age 26 to stay on their parents’ health insurance.
n  We compare soldiers aged 23–25, who gained access, to soldiers aged 27–30, who 
did not.
n  We find the younger soldiers’ reenlistment rates fell 5 percent relative to the older 
soldiers’ rates.
n  Younger soldiers leaving were more likely to enroll in college, possibly helping their 
job opportunities.
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once job lock is removed. However, 
the outcomes may be positive for the 
overall labor market and for affected 
individuals, who now have greater 
ability to pursue additional education 
and/or labor market prospects.
Background
Analyzing “job lock”—that fear of 
losing health benefits prevents workers 
from easily changing jobs, attending 
college, or starting a business—is 
difficult with traditional survey data 
because important considerations 
such as the health status of the worker, 
differences in insurance generosity, and 
whether a worker quit or was fired are 
generally unknown. However, the U.S. 
Army serves as a perfect “laboratory” 
for this question.
Through affiliation with the United 
States Military Academy, we have 
access to detailed data regarding 
soldiers and dependents from the 
Office of Economic and Manpower 
Analysis. In our data, we observe a 
soldier from the day she joins the army 
to the day she separates. Our office has 
begun to link these data to those from 
other federal agencies to understand 
what happens when a soldier leaves the 
army. When a soldier joins the army, 
she signs a contract that binds her to 
the military for between three and six 
years. During military service, soldiers 
must maintain strict health and fitness 
requirements, but they receive free 
health insurance (called TRICARE) 
and are compensated at the same fixed-
rate schedule (within pay grade). At 
the end of an enlistment contract, the 
army evaluates the solider and her job 
performance and then decides whether 
to make an offer of reenlistment; 
[Job] Locked and [Un]loaded
The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Dependency Mandate 
on Reenlistment in the U.S. Army
Michael S. Kofoed and Wyatt J. Frasier
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After ACA passage in 2010, younger 
soldiers began to reenlist at a lower 
rate, and this effect appears to 
persist over time.
to change differently. Second, we 
compare the original early 20s and 
late 20s age groups, but we pretend 
that Congress passed the ACA in 
2008 instead of 2010.  Since this did 
not actually happen, we would not 
expect reenlistment rates to change 
differentially in 2008 and 2009.  
Indeed, when we change the ages of the 
treatment groups or the timing of the 
policy change, our results disappear. 
Thus, like a combination on a locker, 
we see changes in reenlistment rates 
only when we combine the right 
age group that was affected by the 
policy with the correct year in which 
the policy change occurred. These 
“placebo” tests are evidence that our 
results are a consequence of the ACA 
and not some other outside influence.
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if offered, the soldier then chooses 
whether to reenlist or separate. These 
institutional characteristics allow us 
to control for many factors that could 
affect a person’s employment decision 
that are not available in traditional 
labor market data.
Divergence in Reenlistment Rates
We compare reenlistment rates for 
two age groups of soldiers—those 23–
25 and those 27–30—before and after 
implementation of the ACA. Figure 
1 shows the average reenlistment rate 
for each group for every year in our 
sample. The blue line represents our 
“treatment group” of soldiers who are 
23–25, while the green line represents 
our “control group” of soldiers who are 
27–30. Before the ACA, younger and 
older soldiers reenlisted (when offered 
the opportunity) at nearly the same 
rates. After 2010, however, younger 
soldiers began to reenlist at a much 
lower rate, and this effect appears to 
persist over time. For the army, this 
meant reenlistments fell by more than 
3,200 soldiers, requiring additional 
costs and time to recruit and train 
replacements. But can we attribute the 
fall in reenlistment rates to the ACA, or 
did it stem from something else?
One concern about these visual 
findings is that different characteristics 
of the soldiers could be driving the 
results. However, when we control for 
the soldier’s gender, race, home state, 
and education level, our findings do 
not change at all. Another concern 
could be differences in reenlistment 
bonuses. In the army, soldiers of the 
same rank, branch, and month of 
contract expiration are assigned the 
same bonus. We included a control 
that allowed us to compare soldiers 
of similar rank and branch who differ 
only in age. While the magnitude of 
our result shrinks slightly, it remains 
sizable.
It is also possible our findings 
are a result of deaths in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. For example, if casualties 
spike because of an increase in 
violence, younger soldiers may 
become more risk averse and less 
likely to reenlist. Alternatively, because 
unemployment was increasing during 
the Great Recession at the same time 
that the ACA took effect, some older 
soldiers may have been more likely to 
reenlist to avoid a difficult job market. 
Additionally, since some states were 
expanding Medicaid during this 
period, we may worry about how 
the generosity of the home state’s 
welfare programs affected the decision 
to reenlist. However, when we add 
controls for each of these factors, our 
core results remain unchanged.
Finally, because the Great Recession 
led to an onslaught of new regulations 
and laws, the change in reenlistment 
rates could instead be affected by a 
policy change other than the ACA. 
To check this possibility, we simulate 
two “pretend” or “placebo” changes. 
First, we compare reenlistment rates 
of soldiers aged 27–30 with those 
aged 30–33; since neither age group 
was affected by the ACA, we would 
not expect their reenlistment rates 
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The Key to Job Lock?
To show that the decrease in 
reenlistment is a product of job lock, 
it would be helpful to understand 
whether soldiers are leaving the army 
for increased opportunities, such 
as higher-paying jobs or additional 
schooling. Unfortunately, we have not 
linked our army data with income data, 
but we can access GI Bill usage from 
the Department of Veterans Affairs. 
We find that soldiers who have access 
to their parents’ health insurance are 
about 1 percentage point more likely to 
use their GI Bill benefits, from a base 
of 53 percent.  This result shows that, 
with the increase in separate health 
coverage, soldiers are leaving the army 
for educational opportunities.
Our findings present an interesting 
conundrum for the Department of 
Defense and health care policymakers 
that might not be unique to the 
military. For example, we also find 
that the drop in reenlistment rates of 
younger soldiers who subsequently use 
their GI Bill benefits is concentrated 
among those with the highest military 
standardized test scores, suggesting 
that employers may be losing some 
of their most talented employees 
once job lock is removed. This loss 
is particularly painful for the army 
because the military does not allow 
“lateral” hires (i.e., management from 
outside the organization) among its 
active-duty personnel. For the army 
to have future senior leaders—from 
senior noncommissioned officers 
to colonels and generals—it cannot 
simply hire managers from the private 
sector, but must grow them from 
20-year-olds who start their careers as 
privates (if enlisted) or lieutenants (if 
commissioned officers). Thus, the army 
will need to increase its recruiting and 
retention spending to ensure that it 
manages its talent efficiently. 
However, while our results may 
be discouraging for the U.S. Army, 
they may be positive for individuals 
and the labor market. We provide 
evidence that the ACA decreased labor 
market frictions from job lock. Once 
health insurance becomes portable 
(through eligibility for a parent’s 
plan), the soldier—and possibly other 
employees—can now afford to pursue 
acquiring additional human capital 
that may lead to better job prospects.
This article draws on research from an 
Upjohn Institute working paper, which can 
be found at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/300/. 
The views expressed herein are those of the 
authors and do not reflect the position of the 
United States Military Academy, the Department 
of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
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United States Military Academy. Wyatt J. Frasier is 
an officer in the U.S. Army. 
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While our results may be 
discouraging for the U.S. Army, 
they may be positive for 
individuals and the labor market.
Upjohn Institute Report Offers Ideas To Help 
Communities Build Broadly Shared Prosperity
In 2018, the Upjohn Institute launched an initiative to learn how 
communities can help residents get and keep good jobs. Called “Promise: 
Investing in Community,” the initiative marshaled Institute research 
expertise in place-based 
college scholarships, workforce 
development and training, tax 
incentives, and customized 
business services.
This three-year initiative 
marks its first year with a report 
that summarizes what we’ve 
learned to date. The report, 
Building Shared Prosperity: How 
Communities Can Create Jobs for 
All, outlines strategies that small 
and medium-sized cities, along 
with rural areas, can follow to 
achieve broadly shared prosperity.
Communities help residents 
find and keep good jobs in two 
main ways: 1) by investing in workers through education and training, 
and 2) by investing in businesses through incentives and direct business 
assistance. Both approaches contribute to the same goal: more and better 
jobs, with benefits shared across demographic and income groups.
In this report, community leaders will find summaries of best practices, 
backed by evidence, in three broad categories: place-based scholarships; 
workforce training; and support to businesses. A fourth chapter offers 
lessons to help community leaders pull these best practices together into an 
overall strategy, rooted in their local assets and identity.
Download the report for free at www.upjohn.org.
Good 
Jobs for All, outlines strategies 
that small and medium-sized 
cities, along with rural areas, can 
follow to achieve broa ly shared 
prosperity.
Communities help residents 
find and keep good jobs in two main ways: 1) by investi g in workers 
through education a d training, and 2) by investing in bus nesses through 
incentives and direct business assistance. Both pproaches contribut  to the 
same goal: more and better job , with benefits shared across demographic 
and income groups.
In this report, ommunity leaders will find summaries of best practices, 
backed by evide ce, i  three b oad categori s: place-based scholarships; 
workforce training; and support to b sines s. A fourth chapter offers 
lessons to h lp community l aders pull these best practices together into an 
overall strategy, rooted in their local assets and identity.
Download the report for free at https://bit.ly/20bcmnL.
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“[Job] Locked and [Un]loaded: The Effect 
of the Affordable Care Act Dependency 
Mandate on Reenlistment in the U.S. Army." 
Michael S. Kofoed and Wyatt J. Frasier. 2019. 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper 19-300. 
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-300
"Climate Change and Occupational Health: 
Are There Limits to Our Ability to Adapt?" 
Marcus Dillender. 2019. Upjohn Institute 
Working Paper 19-299. https://doi.
org/10.17848/wp19-299
The Upjohn Press now makes available books from its backlist—as well as select 
frontlist titles and its WEfocus books—as free PDF downloads. We invite you to 
access this wealth of scholarship written by leading researchers and practitioners 
on a wide range of labor-related issues.
Browse our titles at https://research.upjohn.org/openaccess/.
Open Access Titles
"Payroll, Revenue, and Labor Demand 
Effects of the Minimum Wage." 
Ekaterina Jardim and Emma van Inwegen. 
2019. Upjohn Institute Working Paper 19-
298. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-298
"Do SNAP Work Requirements Work?" 
Timothy F. Harris. 2019. Upjohn Institute 
Working Paper 19-297.  https://doi.
org/10.17848/wp19-297
“An Apple a Day? Adult Food Stamp 
Eligibility and Health Care Utilization 
among Immigrants." 
Chloe N. East and Andrew I. Friedson. 2019. 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper 19-295. 
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-295
Access all Upjohn Institute Working 
Papers at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/.
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